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Recent Developments 
Witte v. Azarian: 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland Indentified Activities to be Calculated in 
Determining the Percentage of a Medical Expert's Professional Time Directly 
Involving Testimony 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held profes-
sional activity of a medical expert 
directly involves testimony when the 
expert: (1) is in, or traveling to or 
from, deposition or trial for the 
purpose oftestifying; (2) assists a 
litigation team in developing or 
responding to discovery; (3) reviews 
notes, prepares reports, or confers 
with a litigation team after being 
informed of the likelihood that the 
expert will be called to testify; and 
(4) is engaged in any similar activity 
that has a clear and direct 
relationship to the expert's 
testimony. Witte v. Azarian, 369 
Md. 518, 535-36, 801 A.2d 160, 
171 (2002). In so holding, the court 
interpreted Md. Code Ann., Cts. & 
Jud. Proc. § 3-2A-04(b)(4), which 
mandates that an expert may devote 
no more than 20% of his or her 
annual professional activities to 
"activities that directly involve 
testimony in personal injury claims." 
Id. at 521,801 A.2d at 162. 
Mr. and Mrs. Azarian 
("Azari an") filed a claim with the 
Health Claims Arbitration Office 
("HCAO"), alleging negligence in 
the medical services provided to 
Mrs. Azarian by Dr. Witte ("Witte"). 
As required by statute, Azarian also 
filed the certificate of a medical 
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expert, Dr. Lawrence Honick 
("Honick") attesting that Honick 
was a licensed health care provider, 
and that less than 20% of his annual 
professional activities directly 
involved testimony in personal ~ury 
claims. The certificate attested that 
Honick had reviewed the medical 
records related to Witte's treatment 
of Azarian, that Witte was negligent 
in his treatment, and that his negli-
gence proximately caused perman-
ent injury to Azarian. 
Following Azarian's waiver of 
arbitration, the case was transferred 
to the Circuit Court for Mont-
gomery County. The trial court 
granted summary judgment in favor 
of Witte, finding that Honick 
devoted more than 20% of his 
annual professional time to activities 
directly involving testimony in 
personal injury cases. The court of 
special appeals reversed and 
remanded, rejecting the trial court's 
"expansive construction of the 
phrase 'directly involve testimony. '" 
Id. at 526, 801 A.2d at 165. The 
court of appeals granted certiorari 
to determine the kinds of activities 
to be counted in calculating the 20% 
pursuant to Maryland Code, § 3-
2A-04(b)(4) of the Courts and 
Judicial Proceedings Article. 
The court identified its task as 
one of statutory construction and 
looked first to the language of the 
statute to determine legislative 
intent. Id. at 525,801 A.2d at 165. 
Finding the wording ambiguous as 
to the meaning of the phrase 
"directly involving testimony," the 
court turned to the legislative 
history to determine the intent ofthe 
General Assembly. Id. at 526,801 
A.2d at 165. This statute was part 
of a procedure devised for 
resolution of health care malpractice 
claims in response to a crisis in the 
malpractice insurance market in 
1976. Id. 
When the initial bill did not 
pass, the Governor created a task 
force on medical malpractice 
insurance to make recommend-
ations for eliminating excessive 
damages and reducing the fre-
quency of malpractice claims. 
Witte, 369 Md. at 529-30, 801 
A.2d at 167 (2002). These 
recommendations included a 
requirement that a qualified expert 
filing a certificate with the HCAO 
derive no more than 50% of his or 
her income annually from testimony 
related to healthcare malpractice 
claims.ld at 530,801 A.2d at 167. 
In 1986, a Senate Bill incorporating 
these recommendations passed with 
a modification that experts be 
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disqualified if "more than 20% of the 
expert's professional activities 
(annually) directly involve testi-
mony in personal injury claims." Id. 
at 530,801 A.2d at 168 (emphasis 
provided). 
The legislative history did not 
indicate the specific activities the 
Legislature intended to include in 
calculating the 20%. Id. at 531, 801 
A.2d at 168. The court found no 
similar statutes for comparison in other 
jurisdictions, referring to this as a 
"peculiarly Maryland provision." Id. 
The court noted that a reading of the 
statute that would unreasonably limit 
the pursuit or defense of an existing 
cause of action should be avoided 
because of the constitutional dilemma 
this would present. Id. at 533, 801 
A.2d at 169. The condition in the 
statute regarding expert witnesses 
applies to defendants as well as 
plaintiffs. Witte, 369 Md at 533,801 
A.2d at 169 (2002). If the statute 
was construed expansively, it could 
limit a defendant's ability to defend an 
action in violation of Articles 19 and 
24 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights.ld. at 533-34, 801 A.2d at 
169-70. 
The court of appeals concluded 
that consideration of all the evidence 
provided two clues as to the 
Legislature's intent in enacting this 
statute.ld. at 534, 801 A.2d at 170. 
First, the Legislature intended,that a 
category of "professional ~itness" 
not be qualified as an expert com-
petent to sign a certificate for purposes 
of this statute. Id. Secondly, reducing 
the percentage from 50% to 20% 
evidenced the Legislature's concern 
that the statute should not shrink the 
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pool of eligible experts so to deny a 
party the ability to pursue or defend a 
claim.ld. at 534,801 A.2d at 170. 
In consideration of these factors, 
the court held that the professional 
activity of a medical expert directly 
involves testimony when the expert is 
in, or traveling to or from deposition 
or trial for the purpose of testifying. 
Id. at 535,801 A.2d at 171 (2001). 
The time an expert spends assisting a 
litigation team in developing or 
responding to discovery is also 
calculated. Witte, 369 Md. at 535, 
801 A.2d at 171 (2002). Time spent 
reviewing notes, preparing reports, 
and conferring with members of a 
litigation team after being informed 
that it is likely that the expert will be 
called to testify is counted as well. Id. 
at 535-36,801 A.2d at 171. Finally, 
any similar activity with a clear and 
direct relationship to testimony being 
given by a doctor in a malpractice 
case is calculated in determining the 
percentage.ld. at 536, 801 A.2d at 
171. Application of these factors to 
the circumstances of the present case 
revealed that the court of special 
appeals correctly found that Honick 
met the under 20% requirement and 
qualified to sign a certificate in support 
ofAzarian's claim. Id. 
In Witte v. Azarian, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland provided a 
statutory construction of Md. Code 
Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-2A-
04(b)(4), determining the types of 
activities to be included in calculating 
the percentage of time an expert 
devotes annually to testimony directly 
involving personal injury claims. 
Maryland is currently the only state 
with such a unique requirement. The 
court's decision sets an important 
standard for future Maryland personal 
injmy litigation, resulting in a widerpool 
of experts, as no one expert may 
spend more than 20% of his or her 
time engaged in the indicated 
activities. However, it may also result 
in a poorer quality of expert, as those 
most qualified to provide testimony 
will be precluded from testifying in 
some cases. 
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